



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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EO 11652: GDS

TRGS: PARM MILI CU UR
SUBJ: CUBA, MOSCOW, AND TREATY OF TLATELOLCO

1. BREZHNEV'S APRIL 25 KONSOMOL SPEECH ASSURANCE THAT SOVIETS WILL APPARENTLY ADHERE TO PROTOCOL II OF TREATY OF TLATELOLCO IS CITED ONLY BRIEFLY, IN PASSING, IN APRIL 26 GRAMMA. SOVIET-CUBAN COMMUNIQUE (ISSUED AT CONCLUSION OF PALMERCA VISIT TO USSR) TOTALLY OMITTS MENTION OF SOVIET MOVE TO ADHERE TO TLATELOLCO. PRESUMING THAT SOVIETS BRIEFED CUBANS, WE VIEW NON-INCLUSION IN COMMUNIQUE AS EVIDENCE THAT CUBANS FOR PRESENT ARE STILL MAKING TLATELOLCO SIGNATURE CONTINGENT ON IMPROVEMENT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH US (SEE HAVANA 963). COMMENT: SOVIET CUBAN COMMUNIQUE'S MENTION OF LIFTING OF EMBARGO AND RETURN OF GUANTANAMO MAY BE INDICATION OF CUBAN MINIMUM CONDITIONS.)

2. AT SAME TIME, WHILE MOSCOW CLEARLY HAS MOTIVES FOR APPEARING TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM CUBA (IN LIGHT OF WESTERN FUROR OVER HORN OF AFRICA SITUATION) AND TO CURRY MEXICO'S FAVOR (IN LIGHT OF LOPEZ PORTILLO'S UPCOMING VISIT), WE DOUBT STRONGLY WHETHER SOVIETS WOULD HAVE MOVED ON TLATELOLCO WITHOUT AT LEAST GESTURE OF ACQUIESCENCE BY CUBANS.

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7 THEREFORE, WE ASSUME THAT CUBANS MAY HAVE INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO TOLERATE SOVIET ADHESION AND MAY, INDEED, BE RESIGNED TO EVENTUAL FORMAL RELEGATION OF CUBA TO NON-NUCLEAR STATUS. (COMMENT: CUBANS HAVE ALREADY STATED THAT THEY WILL ACCEPT IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION WHICH SOVIETS WILL BEGIN INSTALLING IN NEXT FEW YEARS. WE NOTE ALSO THAT SOVIET-CUBAN COMMUNIQUE ENDORSES SOVIET EFFORTS TO REACH CTB.)

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3. SOVIET DECISION TO ADHERE TO TLATELOCO, COMING SO SOON AFTER RENEWED WESTERN RUMORS OF SOVIET NUCLEAR BASE CONSTRUCTION AT CIENFUEGOS, DOES HAVE PROFOUND SIGNIFICANCE

ON NATURE OF SOVIET MILITARY USE OF CUBA. IT IS, THEREFORE, AN IMPORTANT SYMBOLIC GESTURE TOWARD MEETING US SECURITY CONCERNS WITH REGARD TO CUBA. WHILE PROTOCOL II WILL NOT BAN FUTURE PORT CALLS BY SOVIET NUCLEAR-CAPABLE SHIPS OR AIRCRAFT VISITS BY NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT (E.G. BACKFIRE),

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